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Highlights 
 The Government of Malawi is currently reviewing the Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
(FISP) with the aim of cutting costs. 
 
 The debate focuses on whether the FISP should target commercial farmers and be better 
harmonized with social protection interventions, such as the Social Cash Transfer 
Programme (SCTP). 
 
 This study shows that there are positive synergies between SCTP and FISP in terms of 
increasing expenditure and the value of agricultural production, crop production, 
livestock and, to a lesser extent, improving food security. 
 
 The study provides empirical evidence – taken from survey data – on the interplay 
between an agricultural development and a social protection intervention in Malawi. 
This is likely to be of interest to other countries in the region that operate similar types 
of programmes. 
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1. Introduction 
The Government of Malawi is currently reviewing its Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP), 
which was initiated in 2005/2006 to combat poverty and food insecurity. This paper is intended 
to inform the FISP review and, in particular, to suggest how it could be coordinated with the 
Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) to more effectively fulfil Malawi’s objectives of 
reducing poverty and food insecurity. The FISP and the SCTP have been implemented 
simultaneously since 2006 with limited strategic coordination, even though both programmes 
aim to reduce poverty and vulnerability to hunger in poor households that mostly rely on 
agriculture as their main source of income. 
Recent policy declarations emphasize that, by working together, agriculture and social 
protection can play an important role in tackling poverty and hunger. For example, the 39th 
Session of the Committee on World Food Security urged member states – including Malawi – 
to strengthen the coordination between agriculture and social protection (CFS, 2012). Regional 
policy declarations, such as the 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth 
and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods, also recognize the role 
that the two domains can jointly play in achieving regional goals on poverty and hunger. 
Nevertheless, interventions that bring together agriculture and social protection are still 
unusual. Case studies in seven countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America show that there 
is limited coordination between agricultural and social protection programmes, even when they 
have similar aims and stakeholders (Slater et al., 2016).  
In Malawi, the FISP and the SCTP are expected to have an impact on outcomes related to 
poverty and hunger. The FISP should directly influence production decisions; its contribution 
to reducing hunger and poverty is mediated by factors such as access to land, water and labour 
for food production, responsiveness of yields to increased inputs, climatic factors and the 
relative position of poor smallholders as net buyers or sellers of grains in food markets. On the 
other hand, the SCTP is a welfare intervention that acts directly on the consumption capability 
of the recipients: the additional cash dispensed by the programme can be used to directly 
increase both quantity and quality of food. In addition, recipients of the cash transfer can use it 
for purchasing productive inputs and assets.  
Due to cuts in public expenditure, the national debate focuses on reducing the cost of the FISP. 
One of the options being considered is to retarget the FISP to more commercially-oriented 
farmers. These are expected to generate a greater supply response to the FISP than do poorer 
households, which are often labour-constrained and which have been included in the FISP for 
the past several years. Since poor and ultra-poor households also participate in the SCTP, the 
debate is considering whether the FISP should aim to reach the same households as the SCTP 
or whether it should target entirely different categories of farmers (i.e. only commercially- 
oriented farmers). While the debate includes political, ethical and economic considerations, 
this paper is only concerned with the economic implications of the different targeting options 
under consideration. 
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The paper investigates the impacts on poor and ultra-poor households that participate in either 
the FISP or the SCTP or that take part in both programmes at the same time. In assessing the 
impacts of combined interventions, we focus on two types of synergies: i) the complementarity 
between the SCTP and the FISP, i.e. whether the impact of both interventions undertaken 
together is larger than the sum of the impacts of these interventions when undertaken 
separately; ii) the incremental impact of receiving the FISP when a household already receives 
the SCTP, as well as the incremental impact of receiving the SCTP when a household already 
receives the FISP. More formally, we consider two interventions – the FISP and the SCTP – 
whose impact on, for example, per capita expenditure when offered separately is, respectively, 
α and β, and whose impact when offered together is γ. For outcomes that are expected to be 
positively affected by each intervention (with a positive impact on per capita expenditure or 
value of production, for example), the two interventions are complementary if γ> α +β, i.e. 
when the combined impact of the two interventions when implemented together is greater than 
the sum of impacts when implemented separately (Gertler et al., 2011). Furthermore, the 
difference between γ and α measures the incremental impact of FISP when a household already 
receives SCTP, and the difference between γ and β measures the incremental impact of the 
SCTP when a household already receives the FISP. 
In recent years, several studies have focused on the impact of the SCTP (Covarrubias, Davis 
and Winters, 2012; Handa et al., 2015; Asfaw, Pickmans and Davis, 2015) and the FISP in 
Malawi (see, for example, Chirwa and Dorward, 2013; Jayne and Ricker-Gilbert, 2011; 
Dorward et al., 2013; Asfaw, Cattaneo and Pallante, 2016).1 However, there is limited 
empirical evidence with regard to the potential synergies between the two programmes nor are 
there ex ante estimates of the effectiveness of the proposed changes to the existing FISP design 
and their potential complementarities with the SCTP. This paper contributes to filling this 
knowledge gap and thereby to informing the ongoing policy debate in the country. While the 
findings are specific to Malawi, it is likely that they will be of interest to other countries in the 
region that operate similar types of programmes.    
The paper analyses the impacts of the programmes on a variety of outcomes, including 
household expenditure (on food and non-food) and food security, as well as intermediary 
outcomes such as productive activities (crop production, input use), and livestock owned.  
We take advantage of data collected from a seventeen-month evaluation (2013-2014) of a 
sample of households eligible to receive the SCTP. These data also contain information on 
whether the household was included into FISP. 
Since the impacts of the two programmes are likely to differ across households with different 
labour endowments, we analyse labour-unconstrained and labour-constrained households 
separately as well as together. Labour constraints can be considered as proxies for wealth and 
the capacity to generate income, and are therefore likely to mediate the effect of both the SCTP 
                                                 
1 Asfaw, Cattaneo and Pallante (2016) assess the cost and benefits from the current FISP in Malawi and 
compare them with costs and benefits from the implementation of a budget-neutral universal fertilizer subsidy, 
recently proposed as a policy option in the debate about the reform of the FISP. Asfaw et al. (which is still an 
unpublished manuscript) and this paper can be considered therefore as complementary research works. 
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and the FISP. We define a household as labour-constrained if it lacks an able-bodied member 
who is fit-to-work, i.e. every adult suffers from chronic illness and/or disability.  
The next section of the paper gives some background on Malawi and briefly describes the FISP 
and the SCTP. Section 3 reviews previous evidence on the interplay between the two 
programmes in Malawi. Section 4 presents the empirical approach and the estimation method 
used in the paper. The main results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 
6 offers some conclusions. 
2. Background: Poverty and agricultural context and 
the FISP and SCTP in Malawi  
The Republic of Malawi is among the poorest countries in the world. The Human Development 
Index (HDI) in 2014 ranked Malawi 174th out of 189 countries with an HDI of 0.414.  
In 2014, Malawi’s economy continued on a path to recovery in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis of 2012, which saw a contraction in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth to 2.1 
percent. Real GDP growth was 5.7 percent in 2014, largely driven by agriculture, but with 
significant contributions from manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and services (African 
Economic Outlook, 2015). Growth in 2015 was 5.5 percent, due to the late arrival of rains and 
the severe floods experienced in January, which damaged crops and infrastructure.  
Agriculture accounts for nearly 35 percent of GDP, as compared with services and industry, 
which account, respectively, for 46 and 19 percent of GDP. Agriculture employs about 80 
percent of the workforce, the majority of whom are women. Furthermore, agriculture accounts 
for more than 80 percent of export earnings. Overall, agriculture supports nearly 85 percent of 
the population and contributes significantly to national and household food security. According 
to the World Bank (2010), close to 2 million of the total 2.7 million hectares of cultivated land 
in the country are cultivated by smallholder farmers, who tend to work small and fragmented 
landholdings averaging less than 1 hectare per household.  
Development resources, strategies and policies in Malawi since independence have 
emphasized agricultural development and the country continues to benefit from substantial, 
multiyear donor aid. Productivity and overall production remain low in the smallholder sector 
as compared to larger commercial estates. Indeed, even though maize yields almost doubled 
between 1980 and 2010 in Malawi, the overall yields are still lower than regional levels. The 
uptake of improved farming inputs has been low and smallholder agriculture remains 
unprofitable. Smallholder farmers have limited access to extension services and productivity-
enhancing technologies due to their weak links to markets, high transport costs, limited and 
fragile farmers’ organizations, poor quality control and inadequate information on markets and 
prices (FAO, 2012). 
Despite the positive economic growth registered over much of the past decade, progress on 
poverty reduction has been limited. According to the Malawian National Statistical Office 
(NSO), Malawi’s poverty level decreased only marginally from 52.4 percent in 2005 to an 
estimated 50.7 percent in 2011. The proportion of ultra-poor people increased from 22.2 
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percent in 2005 to 25.7 percent in 2011. The incidence of rural poverty in fact increased slightly 
from 55.9 percent in 2005 to 56.6 percent in 2012, while urban poverty fell sharply from 25 
percent in 2004 to 17 percent in 2011. As a consequence, the pattern of income distribution has 
become more skewed, with the Gini coefficient increasing from 0.390 in 2005 to 0.439 in 2013 
(World Bank, 2013). The slow progress in poverty reduction and worsening income 
distribution suggest that growth has not been inclusive and both poverty and income 
distribution have been aggravated by the high vulnerability of poor households to shocks (e.g. 
health, floods, drought and price increases).  
Through the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) II, the Government of 
Malawi has reinforced its poverty reduction efforts using a multifaceted approach.  
This includes a focus on social development, the improvement of infrastructure, agricultural 
transformation and job creation.  
Currently, the Government is working on measures to improve efficiencies and coherence 
across social protection programmes, as well as between social protection programmes and 
those of other sectors, including agriculture. The Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) and 
the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP), which are described in the next subsections, are 
examples of social protection and agricultural interventions that could be better coordinated in 
order to more effectively combat poverty and food insecurity in Malawi.  
2.1 Farm Input Subsidy Programme  
After being out of favour during the 1990s and early 2000s, input subsidy programmes have 
been reintroduced in many African countries as a major component of national agricultural 
policies (Jayne and Rashid, 2013). In Malawi, the Farm Input Subsidy Programme was initiated 
in 2005-2006.2  At that time, it targeted approximately 50 percent of the farmers in the country, 
distributing fertilizers for maize production, with further vouchers for tobacco fertilizer and 
improved maize seeds.3 The FISP is financed by the Government, with international donor 
support. (Chirwa, Matita and Dorward, 2011). The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and 
Water Development leads the design and implementation of the FISP. The main objectives of 
the programme are to achieve national food sufficiency and increase the income of resource-
poor smallholder farmers through increased maize and legume production driven by access to 
improved agricultural inputs (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011).  
This kind of intervention is not new; it follows decades of agricultural policy interventions that 
varied in terms of generosity and targeting criteria. From the mid-70s to the early 90s,  
the Government financed a universal fertilizer subsidy, subsidized smallholder credit and 
controlled maize prices. This system began to break down in the late 80s-early 90s and 
collapsed in the mid-90s, which led to a widespread perception that falling fertilizer support 
was causing a decline in maize production and a food and political crisis. As a consequence, 
Malawi shifted from providing universal price subsidies for fertilizer and seed to providing 
                                                 
2 At that time the programme was known as the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme or AISP. 
3 For an extensive review of the implementation and impact of the programme, see Chirwa and Dorward (2013)  
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small ‘starter packs,’ initially to all households (in 1998/99 and 1999/2000) and then to a more 
limited and varying number of targeted households (from 2000/2 to 2004/5) (Harrigan, 2003). 
Despite these subsidies, many households continued to suffer from severe food insecurity, 
particularly after the poor production season in 2004/5. This prompted a significant political 
emphasis on larger subsidies, and in 2005/6, the Government decided to implement a large-
scale input subsidy programme across the country. Over time, key features of this programme 
have undergone substantial modifications in terms of objectives (changing from social 
protection and food security for vulnerable households to national food production and self-
sufficiency), scale (from a total programme cost of 4 480 million MWK in 2005/2006 to 23 
455 million MWK in 2011/2012), quantity of subsidized fertilizer supplied (from nearly  
15 000 tonnes in 2005/6 to 216 000 tonnes in 2007/8 and a subsequent decline to around 140 
000 tonnes in 2011/2012), cash redemption of vouchers (through the Smallholder Farmers’ 
Fertilizer Revolving Fund of Malawi and the Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation in 2005/2006 and, for cotton inputs, through Agricultural Development Divisions 
since 2007/2008, and the addition of tobacco inputs. Chirwa and Dorward (2013) and Dorward 
and Chirwa (2011) summarise the principal changes in design and implementation 
arrangements over time.  
Currently, the programme targets smallholder farmers who are resource-poor but own a piece 
of land. The targeting criteria also recognise particularly vulnerable groups, such as child-
headed, female-headed and orphan-headed households, and households with members affected 
by HIV/ AIDS. The criteria are broad and the application of the targeting guidelines varies in 
different communities, particularly as the number of eligible households tends to be much 
larger than the number of fertilizer coupons available. Kilic, Whitney and Winters (2013) find 
that the FISP does not exclusively reach the poor in Malawi. On the contrary, the programme 
primarily reaches people in the middle of the income distribution. The authors explain that this 
stems from community-based targeting (i.e. open forums in which village residents identify 
beneficiaries collectively), which is co-opted by the more influential community members. 
Their analysis suggests that, on average, households that are relatively well-off, connected to 
community leadership and reside in agro-ecologically favourable locations are more likely to 
be FISP beneficiaries and to receive more input coupons. 
In 2013/2014, the Government of Malawi introduced a new tonnage allocation formula in order 
to reduce fertilizer costs. Subsequently in 2015, the Government introduced further reforms to 
facilitate direct private sector retailing and reduce the subsidy level (from 95 percent to 80 
percent). Furthermore, the Government selected 1.5 million beneficiaries at random from a list 
of maize producers, with the intention of alternating beneficiaries on an annual basis and 
providing subsidies to all farmers once in three years.  
Several aspects of FISP implementation have raised questions and are currently under 
discussion: 
 How can FISP be aligned to the National Agricultural Policy to better contribute 
to Malawi’s overall objective of increasing national production, productivity 
and household income?  
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 How can FISP more actively stimulate fertilizer use, crop diversification and 
sustainable land management? 
 Should targeting criteria be changed to gradually reduce the total number of 
beneficiaries and/or to reduce the subsidy level by shifting from subsistence to 
market-oriented farmers? This should lead to a gradual shift towards more 
commercial farmers and to a ‘reallocation’ of the poor subsistence farmers, 
previously included in the FISP, into social protection programmes (SCTP 
and/or public works programmes).  
The paper intends to provide insights on the consequences of taking the action described in the 
final bullet point, in terms of missing opportunities to increase incomes and production among 
the most vulnerable people and enabling them to participate in the process of agricultural 
transformation.  
2.2 The Social Cash Transfer Programme 
The Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) is an unconditional cash transfer programme 
aimed at reducing poverty and hunger among vulnerable households and increasing school 
enrolment. The programme falls under the broad prioritization of social protection in national 
development strategies, including the second theme of the Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy (2006-2010) and the third theme of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II 
(2011-2016). At the national level, the SCTP is managed by the Ministry of Gender, Children 
and Social Welfare (MGCSW), with policy and design oversight by the Ministry of Finance, 
Economic Development and Planning (MFEDP). The programme explicitly targets ultra-poor 
households, which are defined as households unable to meet their most basic urgent needs, 
including for food and essential non-food items, and labour-constrained households.  
A pilot SCTP was initiated in 2006 in the district of Mchinji. The 2007-2008 impact evaluation 
of the pilot demonstrated that the programme had a number of positive outcomes, including 
increased food security, ownership of agricultural tools and curative care-seeking (Miller, 
Tsoka and Reichert, 2010; Covarrubias, Davis and Winters, 2012). Since then, the programme 
has undergone some changes in targeting and operations, as well as a significant expansion to 
18 out of the 28 districts in Malawi. As of April 2015, it reached over 100 000 households.4   
The size of the transfer is adjusted to the number of household members and their 
characteristics. As of May 2015, households with one adult received bi-monthly payments that 
were equivalent to a monthly amount of 1 000 MWK, i.e. around US$3. The transfer has since 
been increased to 1 700 MWK, plus additional cash, based on the number of children enrolled 
in primary or secondary school. 
Although the programme is unconditional, 80 percent of beneficiary households believed that 
they had to fulfil certain conditions in order to continue receiving payments. In particular, the 
households that believed that there was a conditionality thought that they were required to use 
                                                 
4 For details about the programme implementation and funding, see Asfaw, Pickmans and Davis (2015) and 
Handa et al., 2015. 
 7 
 
the funds to purchase school supplies (70 percent), invest in farm or non-farm businesses  
(59 percent) or provide adequate food and nutrition for their children (57 percent). 
3. Previous evidence of the interplay between FISP and 
SCTP in Malawi  
To the best of our knowledge, only a few authors (Ellis and Maliro, 2013; Matita and Chirwa, 
2014; Thome, Taylor and Filipski, 2014) have investigated the interplay between the FISP and 
the SCTP and none of these sought to estimate the impact of the synergies between the two 
programmes on direct beneficiaries.  
Ellis and Maliro (2013) compare several features of fertilizer subsidies and cash transfers, such 
as output and market effects, impacts on vulnerability to hunger, unintended effects, targeting 
accuracy, asset and resource requirements, coverage boundaries, budgeting aspects and 
political dimensions. These comparisons suggest that input subsidies and cash transfers are 
complementary across a range of attributes and that they compensate for each other’s 
weaknesses. In particular, they find that fertilizer subsidies are more effective in improving 
food security among farmers who are able to combine fertilizers with land, labour and 
improved seeds and less effective among farmers that lack land and labour.  
Matita and Chirwa (2014) claim that targeting by SCTP and FISP should be better harmonized 
so that no household participates in both programmes simultaneously. Using a simulation 
analysis implemented with data from the Integrated Household Survey 3 (IHS3), the authors 
identified three target groups for the programmes: i) ultra-poor households with labour 
constraints to be treated under SCTP, ii) ultra-poor households with productive labour available 
to be treated under public works programmes and FISP, and iii) moderately-poor households 
with productive labour available to be treated under FISP. The authors’ findings suggest that 
the gains from retargeting households to either FISP, or SCTP and/or public works are greater 
than from delivering both cash transfers and input subsidies to the same households. 
Thome, Taylor and Filipski (2014) explore the synergies between SCTP and FISP using a local 
economy-wide impact evaluation model. Drawing on national representative data from the 
IHS3, they show that the SCTP has higher overall income multiplier effects than does the FISP 
but that the FISP tends to have higher production multipliers than does the SCTP. Moreover, 
they find that combining the FISP with the SCTP improves the income multipliers of FISP and, 
at the same time, increases the impact of SCTP on production. While Thome, Taylor and 
Filipski (2014) focus on the stand-alone and joint impact of the two programmes on the local 
economy, our contribution investigates the direct stand-alone impact of the two programmes, 
their synergies and the joint effect on beneficiary households.  
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4. Empirical analysis: data and econometric strategy 
This study is based on data collected from a seventeen-month evaluation (2013-2014) of  
a sample of households eligible to receive the SCTP, which also provided information of 
whether the same households were included into the FISP. The data for this study were 
collected and preliminary analysis was carried out by the Carolina Population Center at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) and the Centre for Social Research of 
the University of Malawi (CSR UNIMA) (Handa et al., 2015).  
The UNC-CH and CSR UNIMA took advantage of an expansion in the SCTP to build an 
experimental ‘delayed-entry’ control group, which was implemented in two stages. In the first 
stage, four Traditional Authorities (TAs) in the districts of Salima and Mangochi were 
randomly selected by lottery (Ndidi and Maganga in Salima district and Mbwana Nyambi and 
Jalasi in Mangochi district). Next, eligible households were identified through a mix of proxy 
means testing and community-based targeting in all Village Clusters (VCs5) created in these 
four TAs for the purpose of implementing the programme. The targeting was done by the six 
members of the Community Social Support Committee (CSSC), who were chosen from 
different geographical locations in the VCs under the oversight of the District Commissioner’s 
Office and the District Social Welfare Office.  
A baseline survey of eligible households was completed in July/August 2013, covering  
3 500 households in all four TAs. Just after the baseline survey, half of the VCs were randomly 
assigned to a treatment group and entered the programme immediately, while the other half 
served as a control group in order to measure the impact of the programme; the control group 
was supposed to enter the programme at the end of the evaluation period. The first follow-up 
survey was scheduled twelve months after the baseline survey when beneficiary households 
would have received eight to ten months’ worth of transfers. However, due to a delay in the 
start of payments, the follow-up was postponed until November 2014, at which time 
beneficiary households would have received five payments only (10 months’ worth).  
These data have been extensively analysed by Handa et al. (2015) and Asfaw, Pickmans and 
Davis (2015), focusing exclusively on the stand-alone impact of the SCTP on a broad range of 
outcome variables, including household consumption, food security, productive activities and 
labour supply, among others.  
From the original sample, we selected a subsample in order to identify the stand-alone impacts 
of the SCTP and FISP, their synergies and the collective impact of participating in the FISP 
and SCTP simultaneously. We selected 1 607 households, which were interviewed for both the 
baseline and follow-up surveys. The households fell into four groups: control households that 
neither received the SCTP nor the FISP; households treated exclusively under the SCTP; 
households treated exclusively under the FISP; and households treated under both programmes 
at the same time (respectively, 38.33, 30.18, 14.87 and 16.6 percent of the study sample).  
We excluded the following categories of households from the sample: i) included in FISP in 
the previous two years but not in SCTP at the time of the follow-up survey (564); ii) included 
                                                 
5 VCs are village groups comprising between 800 and 1 500 households each. 
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in FISP in the previous two years and in SCTP at the time of follow-up (558); iii) included in 
FISP at the time of the baseline survey (340); iv) included in FISP at the time of the baseline 
survey and in SCTP at the time of follow-up (294).6 This kind of selection has advantages and 
disadvantages. The exclusion of the four groups of households allowed us to obtain a clean 
setting in which to estimate the effects of the two programmes. However, this selection 
procedure drastically reduced the sample size (from 3 363 to 1 607 households interviewed for 
the baseline and follow-up surveys).7 Potentially, it could also affect the randomized nature of 
the experiment, creating groups with different characteristics at baseline. Indeed, unlike the 
SCTP, participation in the FISP was not randomized in the evaluation design.  
To obtain consistent estimates, we used a quasi-experimental technique that combines 
regression analysis through a difference-in-differences approach and a generalized propensity 
score (GPS) weighting adjustment. We adopted the strategy suggested by Uysal (2015), which 
focuses on doubly robust estimates of multivalued and multifaceted treatments. The GPS 
weighting adjustment allowed us to ‘rebalance’ our study sample and to obtain doubly robust 
estimates of the causal effects of the multifaceted treatments we are analysing in this paper. 
The approach involves comparing the four ‘rebalanced’ groups of households interviewed at 
both baseline and follow-up: those treated exclusively under SCTP, exclusively under FISP, 
treated by both simultaneously, and households excluded by both programmes, which serve as 
a control group. Table A2 shows unweighted tests of the differences between the four groups 
included in the study sample. As suspected, the four groups show significant differences with 
regard to a variety of baseline characteristics and economic indicators. The adjustment 
implemented through the use of the GPS weights solves this problem. Indeed, Table 1 shows 
that, with only one exception, the four groups are identical at baseline. 
By comparing outcomes between these groups, we can estimate the stand-alone impact of each 
programme, their joint impact and their synergies. More formally, equation (1) represents the 
regression equivalent of a difference-in-difference procedure: 
(1)  
diididiididi
diididiidiidi
XFISPSCTPDFISPSCT
FISPDFISPSCTPDSCTPDY
,,,,,3
,2,1,2,1,
)&*(*
)*()(





 
Y represents the main outcome variables. SCTP and FISP are indicator variables for, 
respectively, assignment exclusively to the social cash transfers and the farm input subsidy 
programme. D represents the survey year and is equal to 1 at follow-up, otherwise zero.  
X is the set of household characteristics and controls at community level. µ is an error term. 
All of the estimates are adjusted using generalized propensity score weights. 
                                                 
6 These groups of households represent, respectively, 16.7%, 16.6%, 10.1% and 8.7% of the original study 
sample. 
7 Table A1 in Appendix C provides tests of differences between households excluded versus households 
included in the analysis of this paper. The group of households excluded from the study sample is relatively 
better off. This is not surprising since it includes households that already received agricultural input subsidies at 
baseline or in the previous two years. 
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The parameters of interest are the coefficients β2, γ2, and δ which are, respectively, the average 
treatment estimates of the impact of the SCTP on households participating only in that 
programme (β2); the impact of the FISP for households participating only in that programme 
(γ2); and the estimated joint impact of the SCTP and the FISP on households in both 
programmes (δ). These parameters allow us to estimate the synergies between the two 
programmes. In particular, the difference between δ, β2 and γ2 measures the complementarity 
between the SCTP and the FISP. The difference between δ and β2 measures the incremental 
impact of the FISP on the SCTP. The difference between δ and γ2 measures the incremental 
impact of the SCTP on FISP.  
5. Results of the stand-alone and combined impacts of 
the SCTP and FISP 
Figures 1 and 2 show kernel densities of total household consumption at the time of the baseline 
and follow-up surveys. While at baseline there were no significant differences among the 
distributions, at follow up the distributions of expenditure for the SCTP and for the SCTP plus 
FISP groups, almost coincidentally, shifted significantly to the right. This suggests that without 
controlling for potential confounding factors, the SCTP contributed to an increase in household 
expenditure. The SCTP and the FISP seem to go in the same direction, but most of the change 
in expenditure is due to the effect of the SCTP. In other words, the FISP appears to contribute 
weakly to the increase in expenditure.  
We replicated the same type of exercise for the value of production. Figures 3 and 4 show 
kernel densities of the value of production at baseline and follow-up. As for household 
expenditure, there are no significant differences among the distributions at baseline. However, 
at follow-up, the distributions of the value of production (maize, groundnuts, pigeon pea, 
nkhwani, rice, cotton and sorghum) for the FISP and especially the SCTP plus FISP groups 
shifted significantly to the right, meaning that combining the FISP and SCTP increases the 
value of production. As opposed to total expenditure, here the effect seems to be driven mainly 
by participating in the FISP.  
The following subsections describe and discuss the main findings with regard to a set of 
outcomes: household expenditure and food security and their intermediate outcomes, including 
productive activities (agricultural production and input use) and livestock (ownership and 
expenditure). All estimates are doubly robust: they include a large set of control variables, 
namely, baseline head of household’s characteristics, household demographic composition and 
size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks, and district 
fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the community level. 
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5.1 Household expenditure 
Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the estimated stand-alone impact of the SCTP 
and the FISP, the total impact of the two programmes and their synergy with regard to 
household expenditure. The thick horizontal bars represent the estimated coefficients, while 
the thin horizontal bars show the confidence interval. The figure shows, from left to right:  
i) the stand-alone impact of the SCTP; ii) the stand-alone impact of the FISP; iii) the sum of 
the impacts of the two programmes; and iv) (in red) the joint impact of the SCTP and FISP 
when households benefit from both at the same time. The difference between iii) and  
iv) represents the precise measure of complementarity between the two interventions. Figure 5 
shows that the stand-alone impact of the SCTP on total household expenditure is positive and 
significant but that the stand-alone impact of the FISP is positive but not statistically 
significant. The joint impact is positive and significant and it is 15 percent larger than the sum 
of the stand-alone impacts of the SCTP and FISP. Overall, the estimates for total household 
expenditure confirm and strengthen the main message represented in Figure 2: there are 
positive synergies when households participate in both programmes. Table 2 provides the 
doubly robust estimates of the impacts on total expenditure. In addition to the findings shown 
in Figure 5, Table 2 shows estimates of the incremental impacts of the SCTP on the FISP and 
the incremental impacts of the FISP on the SCTP. While the former is positive and statistically 
significant, the latter is positive but not significant. Moreover, the analysis by labour constraints 
suggests that the stand-alone impact of the SCTP and the FISP are larger for households defined 
as labour-constrained but synergies take place only for households defined as  
labour-unconstrained, and not for the other group.  
Table 3 shows the effect of the programmes on several expenditure items (food, alcohol, health, 
education, clothing and footwear, housing and utilities, furnishing and transport). The results 
for food expenditure are similar to those for total expenditure. Here, the stand-alone impact of 
the SCTP is positive and significant, the stand-alone impact of the FISP is positive but not 
statistically significant, and the total impact is positive and significant. Looking at the estimates 
of other consumption items, the results are more heterogeneous. For example, we find that 
there are synergies between the SCTP and the FISP with regard to expenditures on health and 
education, but not for the other consumption items. Most of the increase in expenditure is due 
to the SCTP. The stand-alone impact of the FISP is significant only for expenditure on housing 
and utilities, but the joint impact of participation in the two programmes simultaneously is 
always positive and significant, with the only exceptions being the items ‘alcohol’ and 
‘transport’. Looking at these results, we need to bear in mind that the FISP does not directly 
provide cash to recipient households. The impact of the FISP on these expenditures may be 
due to i) the FISP producing both a substitution and an income effects (i.e. it is likely to release 
liquidity used for agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and/or seeds); and ii) the vouchers 
provided to FISP-beneficiaries being exchanged for cash.  
The analysis by labour constraints suggests that synergies between the SCTP and the FISP in 
increasing expenditure on food, health, education, housing and furnishing only take place in 
labour-unconstrained households. 
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5.2 Food security  
We consider several proxies for food security (see Table 4). First, we analyse a survey question 
that asked respondents whether they worry that their household will not have enough food.8 
Second, we consider the number of meals consumed per day in the household. Interestingly, 
while the stand-alone impact of the SCTP on food security is positive and significant, the stand-
alone impact of the FISP is statistically significant only for the first indicator. Finally, we 
consider daily per capita caloric intake calculated using kilocalories per gram of edible portion 
of specific foods, multiplied by the quantity – in grams – of specific foods eaten.  
These kilocalorie figures were summed up for participating households, and then divided by 
the number of household members and the days per week, to reveal daily per capita figures.  
As for the other food security indicator, we find that the SCTP allows participating households 
to increase their caloric intake, especially from purchased food, but that the stand-alone 
contribution of the FISP is not significant. Overall, estimates of the joint impact suggest that 
the two interventions improved food security, but positive synergies seem to take place only 
with regard to the number of meals per day and only for households defined as labour-
unconstrained.  
5.3 Agricultural production, agricultural inputs and livestock 
Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of the estimated stand-alone impact of the SCTP 
and the FISP, their joint impact and their synergy with regard to the value of production, 
controlling for a large set of confounding factors at household and community levels.  
The estimates confirm and strengthen the main message of Figure 4: the joint impact is positive 
and significant and there are positive synergies concerning the value of production when 
households participate in both programmes. Indeed, the value of production when households 
participate in the SCTP and the FISP at the same time is 22 percent larger than the sum of the 
stand-alone impacts. Figure 4 also shows that most of the increase in the value of production 
is due to the FISP. Table 5 provides additional information about the incremental effect of the 
SCTP on the FISP and the incremental effect of the FISP on the SCTP. The results show strong 
synergies between the two interventions, since the incremental effect of each programme on 
the other is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the heterogeneity analysis suggests 
that the stand-alone impacts of the SCTP and the FISP are larger for labour-unconstrained 
households, but that more positive synergies take place in households defined as labour-
constrained. This is an important result: the combination of a social protection programme and 
an agricultural development intervention generates more benefits for agricultural production in 
the most disadvantaged households. 
Table 6 shows results for the production of several crops. The FISP positively affects the 
households engaged in maize production and also the quantity of maize produced, especially 
for labour-constrained households. The stand-alone impact of the SCTP is not statistically 
                                                 
8 Note that the results for the variable “worry that household will not have enough food” need to be read 
differently. In this case, a negative and significant coefficient means that the SCTP and the FISP improve food 
security since they contribute to reducing concerns about not having enough food. 
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significant but the effect of joint participation is significant for the most disadvantaged group 
of households. Synergies also occur in the production of this crop. Indeed, the incremental 
impact of the FISP on the SCTP in the case of labour-constrained households is highly 
significant. The effect on labour-unconstrained households is weak, probably because the 
overwhelming majority of labour-constrained households is already engaged in farming 
activities (‘ceiling effect’). As for the production of groundnut, we find that the stand-alone 
impact of the FISP and the joint impact of the FISP and the SCTP are positive and significant 
for both indicators (percentage of household engaged in farming activities and the quantity of 
groundnut produced). 
With regard to the results on agricultural inputs, as expected, the FISP significantly increases 
the percentage of users and the quantity of chemical fertilizers used, and increases the 
percentage of users of improved or hybrid seeds (see Table 7). Overall, the joint impact is 
positive and significant only for chemical fertilizers and the synergies between the two 
programmes seem to be weak.  
Finally, in Tables 8 and 9 we looked at whether the SCTP and the FISP had any impact on 
household expenditure for livestock and whether the ownership of chicken, sheep, goats, 
pigeons, doves and ducks increased. Overall, the results suggest that the stand-alone impacts 
of the SCTP and the FISP are positive and significant, and that the two programmes are 
complementary instruments for increasing ownership of livestock and expenditure on 
livestock. The SCTP directly affects expenditure on livestock by providing cash directly to 
beneficiary households. The positive impact of the FISP on livestock expenditures may be due 
to the fact that FISP it is likely to ease liquidity used for agricultural inputs when the vouchers 
provided to FISP-beneficiaries are exchanged for cash. The results by labour constraints are 
striking: the incremental impact of the FISP on the SCTP, the incremental impact of the SCTP 
on the FISP and their complementarities are stronger in labour-constrained households. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper aims to inform policy discussions on the reform of the FISP and, more specifically, 
how it can be coordinated with the SCTP to combat poverty and food insecurity and help small 
family farmers participate in the process of agricultural transformation. There is increasing 
recognition at the global level of the role that agriculture and social protection can together  
play in combating hunger and poverty and this document contributes to the existing empirical 
evidence by shedding light on the interplay between the FISP and the SCTP in Malawi.  
The analysis shows that there are positive synergies between the SCTP and the FISP in 
increasing expenditure, the value of agricultural production, agricultural activities and 
livestock, and to a lesser extent, in improving food security. More specifically: 
 The SCTP and the FISP are complementary instruments for increasing total household 
expenditure and expenditure on food, health and education. The stand-alone impact of 
the SCTP is larger than that of the FISP for these outcomes. The joint impact of the 
programmes on total expenditure when households benefit from both simultaneously is 
15 percent larger than the sum of the stand-alone impacts. 
 
 The SCTP and the FISP are complementary instruments for increasing the value of 
production, production activities and livestock. The stand-alone impact of the FISP is 
larger than that of the SCTP for these outcomes. The joint impact of the programmes 
on the value of production when households benefit from both simultaneously is  
22 percent larger than the sum of the stand-alone impacts. 
 
 An analysis based on labour constraints shows diverse impacts. On the one hand, the 
synergies between the SCTP and the FISP in terms of increasing household 
expenditures are stronger for labour-unconstrained households. On the other hand, the 
synergies between the two interventions in terms of increasing the value of production 
and production activities are stronger for labour-constrained households. This is an 
important result: the FISP acts more effectively in increasing productive activities for 
the most disadvantaged households when it is combined with cash provided by the 
SCTP.  
Two features of this study need to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. First, given 
the eligibility criteria for inclusion in the SCTP, our sample represents the lower-income 
quantile of the population in Malawi. The SCTP explicitly targets ultra-poor households, which 
are defined as households that are unable to meet their most basic urgent needs, including for 
food and essential non-food items, and labour-constrained households. Second, in this study 
we do not consider any indirect benefits (such as spillover effects on the local economy), nor 
the implied costs of the two programmes. This is purely a study of the direct stand-alone impact, 
joint impact and synergies between the two programmes. 
Our analysis shows that there are positive synergies between the SCTP and the FISP that 
benefit the poorest households in Malawi. In other words, one programme increases the 
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effectiveness of the other and, when households participate in both programmes, they improve 
their productivity and food security. Two factors may explain this result. First, by working 
together, the FISP and the SCTP can address more of the constraints facing poor rural 
households than either programme could do on its own. Second, ensuring coherence between 
the FISP and the SCTP may protect small farmers against unintended harm (Gavrilovic et al., 
2016). Certain agricultural policies can inadvertently be unfavourable to small family farmers 
(Gollin, 2014). By the same token, social protection interventions might also inadvertently have 
negative impacts on agriculture (Devereux, 2009; Bundy et al., 2009; Sumberg and Sabates-
Wheeler, 2011).  
To conclude, the evidence suggests that when agricultural and social protection interventions, 
such as the FISP and the SCTP, complement each other they can have positive medium and 
long-term effects, helping poor households to break the cycle of disadvantage and preventing 
the transmission of poverty across generations. On one hand, the SCTP provides liquidity and 
certainty for poor households and small family farmers, allowing them to invest in agriculture 
and human capital development and to better manage risks. On the other hand, the FISP can 
improve the productivity of small family farmers by addressing structural constraints that limit 
access to inputs, financial services and markets. In addition, as documented by Thome, Taylor 
and Filipski (2014), coordinating the FISP and the SCTP can promote local economic growth, 
increasing employment opportunities in the agricultural sector, improving food availability and 
keeping staple food prices low, with benefits for poor net food buyers (Gavrilovic et al., 2016).   
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Appendix A: Figures 
Figure 1 Kernel density of total household expenditure  
at baseline by treatment groups – real values in log 
 
 
Figure 2 Kernel density of total household expenditure  
at follow up by treatment groups – real values in log 
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Figure 3  Kernel density of value of production at baseline  
by treatment groups – real values in log 
 
Figure 4  Kernel density of value of production at follow up  
by treatment groups – real values in log 
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Figure 5  Impact on household expenditure per capita– MWK real values 
 
Note: the y axis shows the range of the estimated coefficients. The thick horizontal bars represent the estimated 
coefficients, while the thin horizontal bars show the confidence interval. 
 
Figure 6  Impact on value of production – MWK real values 
 
Note: the y axis shows the range of the estimated coefficients. The thick horizontal bars represent the 
estimated coefficients, while the thin horizontal bars show the confidence interval. 
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Appendix B: Tables 
Table 1  Anova test for difference between groups of intervention: control, 
SCTP, FISP, SCTP and FISP (adjusted by the Generalized 
Propensity Score weights) 
  C SCTP FISP 
SCTP and 
FISP F-test 
P-
value>F 
Single head of hh 0.748 0.730 0.751 0.740 0.18 0.9117 
Female head of hh 0.851 0.838 0.820 0.837 0.49 0.692 
Age of head of hh 54.495 54.161 55.087 54.719 0.150 0.927 
# Members in the hh 4.633 4.633 4.454 4.544 0.59 0.618 
# Members in the hh: 0-5 years old 0.783 0.769 0.728 0.771 0.27 0.846 
# Members in the hh: 6-12 years old 1.250 1.256 1.162 1.195 0.74 0.527 
# Members in the hh: 13-17 years old 0.905 0.905 0.873 0.891 0.11 0.956 
# Members in the hh: 18-64 years old 1.178 1.196 1.195 1.170 0.07 0.976 
# Members in the hh: >=65 years old 0.517 0.508 0.496 0.517 0.12 0.951 
# Orphans in the hh 1.099 1.084 1.019 1.035 0.23 0.874 
Yrs of education head of hh  1.272 1.296 1.245 1.385 0.28 0.840 
HH severely labour-constrained 0.456 0.449 0.473 0.463 0.17 0.914 
HH consumption - total 16 4514.5 15 4514.0 16 3867.2 16 0596.9 0.56 0.639 
HH consumption - food and 
Beverages 12 7621.9 11 8176.7 12 4934.0 12 5507.5 0.75 0.523 
HH owns or cultivates land 0.919 0.932 0.937 0.933 0.4 0.754 
Total plot area operated within hh 1.210 1.238 1.220 1.247 0.13 0.944 
HH has plot that is irrigated 0.045 0.045 0.051 0.066 0.76 0.515 
HH applies chemical fertilizer 0.276 0.270 0.353 0.424 9.59 0.000 
HH applies organic fertilizer 0.278 0.265 0.315 0.329 1.72 0.161 
HH uses pesticides 0.015 0.030 0.040 0.030 1.5 0.212 
HH uses improved or hybrid seed 0.283 0.271 0.328 0.348 2.51 0.057 
HH planted maize 0.872 0.872 0.877 0.884 0.12 0.951 
HH planted groundnut 0.094 0.091 0.089 0.136 2.23 0.083 
HH planted pigeon pea 0.098 0.111 0.068 0.115 2.14 0.094 
Value of production 9 505.8 9 143.0 9 570.9 9 830.9 0.35 0.786 
HH owns hand hoe 0.813 0.814 0.837 0.855 1.18 0.317 
HH owns axe 0.100 0.081 0.093 0.100 0.37 0.771 
HH owns panga knife 0.192 0.226 0.242 0.217 1.02 0.383 
HH owns sickle 0.126 0.128 0.107 0.085 1.6 0.187 
HH owns chickens  0.126 0.128 0.107 0.085 1.6 0.187 
HH owns goat or sheep  0.064 0.054 0.051 0.083 1.38 0.246 
Total hh expenditure for livestock 87.79 97.95 43.83 80.277 0.86 0.462 
Total hh livestock sales 275.48 321.27 119.46 293.949 1.63 0.180 
Observations         616 485 239 267     
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Table 2  Impact on total expenditure per capita – real values 
  All Labour-unconstrained Labour-constrained 
  
Total 
expenditure 
Baseline 
mean 
Total 
expenditure 
Baseline 
mean 
Total 
expenditure 
Baseline 
mean 
SCTP*d2014 10 348.555** 40 384.55 5 093.74 32 691.30 15 220.805** 49 843.35 
 [2.44]  [0.96]  [2.76]  
FISP*d2014 2 041.03 44 615.69 -3 590.39 39 623.17 7 957.69 50 181.21 
 [0.53]  [-0.68]  [1.53]  
Joint impact of 
SCTP and FISP 14 290.270** 44 988.36 14 443.217* 35 532.26 11 709.515** 55 976.07 
 [2.59]  [1.97]  [2.39]  
Incremental impact 
of FISP on SCTP 3 941.715  9 349.475*  -3 511.29  
 [1.01]  [1.80]  [-0.75]  
Incremental impact 
of SCTP on FISP 12 249.25**  18 033.6**  3 751.827  
 [2.03]  [2.50]  [0.57]  
Complementarity 1 900.69  12 939.86*  -11 468.98  
  [0.34]   [1.80]   [-1.72]   
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the 
community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household 
demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks and district 
fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the community level. 
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Table 3  Impact on expenditure for different items – real values 
  Expenditure 
  All  Labour-unconstrained Labour-constrained 
Food per capita    
SCTP*d2014 6 013.45 1 377.53 10 058.494** 
 [1.63] [0.29] [2.2] 
FISP*d2014 1 834.64 -2 976.59 6 723.04 
 [0.54] [-0.63] [1.45] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 8 117.414* 7 650.87 6 774.536* 
 [1.83] [1.18] [1.67] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 2 103.96 6 273.344 -3 283.958 
 [0.65] [1.38] [-0.72] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 6 282.779 10 627.46* 51.4941 
 [1.38] [1.79] [0.01] 
Complementarity 269.3276 9 249.934 -10 007 
  [0.06] [1.43] [-1.62] 
Health per capita    
SCTP*d2014 515.10 441.73 545.76 
 [1.45] [1.21] [0.93] 
FISP*d2014 -391.02 -172.20 -857.66 
 [-0.62] [-0.37] [-0.63] 
Joint of impact SCTP and FISP 1 219.446** 1 428.233** 624.29 
 [2.73] [2.38] [1.25] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 704.3511 986.5052 78.52 
 [1.56] [1.61] [0.12] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 1 610.465** 1 600.429** 1 481.94 
 [2.04] [2.16] [1.09] 
Complementarity 1 095.37 1 158.701 936.18 
  [1.36] [1.48] [0.61] 
Education per capita    
SCTP*d2014 225.755*** -22.35 474.719*** 
 [2.94] [-0.16] [3.78] 
FISP*d2014 -72.27 -241.111* 100.19 
 [-1.09] [-1.84] [0.94] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 360.351*** 263.51 401.553** 
 [3.29] [1.39] [2.49] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 134.5952 285.8555 -73.1667 
 [1.11] [1.54] [-0.54] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 432.6177*** 504.6155** 301.3672* 
 [3.84] [2.42] [1.85] 
Complementarity 206.8622 526.9664** -173.3522 
  [1.52] [2.21] [-1.02] 
Clothing and footwear per capita    
SCTP*d2014 962.313*** 946.165*** 906.557*** 
 [7.00] [4.98] [4.5] 
FISP*d2014 187.030*** 57.49 395.723*** 
 [3.05] [0.57] [2.95] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 902.583*** 1 047.960*** 659.761*** 
 [6.34] [5.67] [3.56] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP -59.730 101.795 -246.796 
 [-0.42] [0.44] [-1.37] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 715.553*** 990.476*** 264.038 
 [4.70] [5.17] [1.07] 
Complementarity -246.760 44.310 -642.519 
  [-1.53] [0.17] [-2.84] 
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  Expenditure 
  All  Labour-unconstrained Labour-constrained 
Alcohol/tobacco per capita    
SCTP*d2014 904.796* 1 073.079* 1 152.33 
 [1.84] [1.9] [1.47] 
FISP*d2014 -639.47 -1 409.77 268.39 
 [-1.45] [-1.42] [0.93] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 1264.42 1 317.242* 1 283.34 
 [1.68] [1.88] [1.56] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 359.628 244.163 131.0163 
 [0.43] [0.53] [0.13] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 1 903.891* 2 727.009* 1 014.958 
 [1.83] [1.85] [1.36] 
Complementarity 999.0956 1 653.93 -137.3696 
  [1.05] [1.54] [-0.12] 
Housing/utilities per capita      
SCTP*d2014 263.03 113.83 381.86 
 [1.12] [0.58] [0.93] 
FISP*d2014 262.71 362.361* 269.74 
 [1.39] [1.87] [0.59] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 551.983** 637.101** 472.44 
 [1.97] [2.16] [1.18] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 288.95 523.268** 90.57807 
 [1.10] [2.47] [0.19] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 289.27 274.74 202.6946 
 [0.87] [0.85] [0.36] 
Complementarity 26.24 160.91 -179.1656 
  [0.08] [0.57] [-0.30] 
Furnishings per capita      
SCTP*d2014 514.225*** 314.10 821.313*** 
 [3.97] [1.55] [4.66] 
FISP*d2014 53.89 -15.64 257.12 
 [0.27] [-0.08] [1.19] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 686.711*** 762.469*** 584.281*** 
 [4.43] [3.21] [2.88] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 172.49 448.3676* -237.03 
 [1.23] [1.70] [-1.11] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 632.820** 778.11** 327.1653 
 [2.74] [2.81] [1.4] 
Complementarity 118.60 464.01 -494.1479 
  [0.48] [1.44] [-1.69] 
Transport per capita      
SCTP*d2014 441.010** 444.09 403.254** 
 [1.97] [1.1] [2.28] 
FISP*d2014 351.38 616.15 66.10 
 [1.34] [1.17] [0.29] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 463.75 681.59 126.02 
 [1.59] [1.58] [0.66] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 22.74 237.50 -277.23 
 [0.07] [0.41] [-1.68] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 112.3689 65.44 59.93 
 [0.40] [0.13] [0.29] 
Complementarity -328.64 -378.65 -343.33 
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  [-0.74] [-0.45] [-1.15] 
Communication per capita      
SCTP*d2014 53.835 81.204 30.842 
 [1.59] [1.37] [0.86] 
FISP*d2014 12.697 32.083 2.322 
 [0.49] [0.59] [0.07] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 78.583 116.432 19.666 
 [1.6] [1.44] [0.37] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 24.748 35.229 -11.176 
 [0.45] [0.42] [-0.25] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 65.886 84.349 17.344 
 [1.25] [1.03] [0.27] 
Complementarity 12.051 3.145 -13.499 
  [0.19] [0.03] [-0.24] 
Recreation per capita      
SCTP*d2014 -1.08 1.63 -2.57 
 [-0.46] [0.28] [-1.19] 
FISP*d2014 -4.43 -9.90 0.51 
 [-1.36] [-1.67] [0.28] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP -11.38 -13.79 -7.53 
 [-1.65] [-1.31] [-1.37] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP -10.30 -15.4121 -4.96 
 [-1.35] [-1.03] [-1.24] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP -6.95 -3.89 -8.05 
 [-0.90] [-0.35] [-1.26] 
Complementarity -5.87 -5.52 -5.48 
  [-0.69] [-0.37] [-1.09] 
Hotels and restaurants per capita      
SCTP*d2014 265.650** 227.408* 239.05 
 [2.17] [1.68] [-1.25] 
FISP*d2014 216.315* 52.07 398.202* 
 [1.76] [0.35] [1.74] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 121.09 77.29 209.70 
 [0.63] [0.45] [0.66] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP -144.56 -150.12 -29.3 
 [-0.69] [-0.69] [-0.09] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP -95.221 25.22 -188.50 
 [-0.43] [0.13] [-0.53] 
Complementarity -360.871 -202.19 -427.6 
  [-1.39] [-0.76] [-1.07] 
Miscellaneous      
SCTP*d2014 190.47 95.33 209.19 
 [1.5] [0.68] [1.4] 
FISP*d2014 229.550*** 114.67 334.014** 
 [2.84] [1.33] [2.66] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 535.310*** 474.311** 561.454*** 
 [3.54] [2.22] [3.2] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 344.841** 378.98 352.2612* 
 [2.91] [1.62] [1.84] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 305.76** 359.65 227.4401 
 [2.21] [1.61] [1.45] 
Complementarity 115.29 264.32 18.247 
  [0.82] [1.04] [0.08] 
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the 
community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household 
demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks and district 
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fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the community level. 
Table 4 Impact on food security 
  All  Labour-unconstrained Labour-constrained 
Worry about lack of food    
SCTP*d2014 -0.091** -0.095**  -0.084 
 [-2.17] [-2.12] [-1.57] 
FISP*d2014 -0.046 -0.070** 0.002 
 [-1.51] [-2.28] [0.04] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP -0.076 -0.109* -0.043 
 [-1.68] [-1.72] [-0.76] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 0.015 -0.014 0.04 
 [0.58] [-0.29] [0.72] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP -0.030 -0.039 -0.045 
 [-0.70] [-0.62] [-0.59] 
Complementarity 0.06 0.056 0.038 
  [1.56] [0.92] [0.44] 
Number of meals per day    
SCTP*d2014 0.226*** 0.174** 0.278*** 
 [3.51] [2.36] [3.03] 
FISP*d2014 0.054 -0.016 0.131 
 [0.92] [-0.13] [1.57] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 0.244*** 0.226** 0.237*** 
 [3.25] [2.17] [2.88] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 0.018 0.05 -0.04 
 [0.3] [0.64] [-0.42] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 0.190** 0.241** 0.11 
 [2.79] [2.04] [0.87] 
Complementarity -0.036 0.07 -0.17 
  [-0.42] [0.46] [-1.34] 
Caloric intake in the past 7 days    
SCTP*d2014 187.382** 119.382 280.131** 
 [2.13] [1.24] [2.24] 
FISP*d2014 -12.874 -57.596 63.059 
 [-0.29] [-0.70] [0.74] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 188.926 175.909 267.392** 
 [1.40] [1.03] [2.14] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 1.54 56.53 -75.80 
 [0.01] [0.4] [-0.51] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 201.80 233.50 -12.74 
 [1.43] [1.26] [-0.11] 
Complementarity 14.42 114.12 204.33 
  [0.12] [0.71] [1.54] 
Caloric intake from purchased food    
SCTP*d2014 181.329** 90.501 345.121*** 
 [2.23] [0.93] [4.32] 
FISP*d2014 54.114 0.919 128.241 
 [0.82] [0.01] [1.47] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 211.552** 163.367 294.328*** 
 [2.09] [1.49] [2.79] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 30.22 72.87 -50.79 
 [0.42] [1] [-0.55] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP 157.44 162.45 166.087 
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 [1.58] [1.39] [1.58] 
Complementarity -23.89 71.95 -179.03 
  [0.24] [0.65] [-1.44] 
Caloric intake from produced food    
SCTP*d2014 -41.163 -18.085 -77.454 
 [-0.71] [-0.29] [-1.33] 
FISP*d2014 -6.951 -6.514 -21.837 
 [-0.38] [-0.26] [-1.03] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP -29.016 4.027 -63.326 
 [-0.52] [0.08] [-0.90] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 12.147 22.112 14.128 
 [0.78]  [0.90] [0.48] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP -22.066 10.541 -41.489 
 [-0.41] [0.21] [-0.63] 
Complementarity 19.098 28.626 35.965 
  [0.84] [0.84] [1] 
Caloric intake from gifts    
SCTP*d2014 -4.915 -2.845 -7.85 
 [-1.29] [-0.81] [-1.68] 
FISP*d2014 3.677* 1.431 6.655*** 
 [1.78] [0.50] [3.04] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP -1.503 -1.061 -1.84 
 [-0.37] [-0.26] [-0.39] 
Incremental impact of FISP on SCTP 3.412* 1.784 6.010*** 
 [1.73] [0.58] [2.96] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on FISP -5.180 -2.492 -8.495 
 [-1.18] [-0.50] [-1.91] 
Complementarity -0.265 0.353 -0.645 
  [-0.1] [0.09] [-0.23] 
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the 
community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household 
demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks and district 
fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the community level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
Table 5  Impact on value of production 
  All Labour-unconstrained Labour-constrained 
  
Value of 
production 
Baseline 
mean 
Value of 
production 
Baseline 
mean 
Value of 
production 
Baseline 
mean 
SCTP*d2014 1 215.245 9 143.033 2 338.955* 10 501.45 -170.595 7 472.863 
 (0.85)  [1.66]  [-0.07]  
FISP*d2014 5 001.897*** 9 570.896 5 874.043*** 11 169.23 2 682.042 7 789.116 
 (3.64)  [5.24]  [1.03]  
Joint impact of SCTP 
and FISP 7 609.484*** 9 830.867 7 774.090*** 11 101.51 7 060.743*** 8 354.416 
 (5.88)  [5.63]  [3.78]  
Incremental impact 
of FISP on SCPT 6 394.239***  5 435.135***  7 231.338***  
 (6.93)  [3.67]  [4.06]  
Incremental impact 
of SCTP on FISP 2 607.587*  1 900.047  4 378.7*  
 (1.70)  [1.28]  [1.9]  
Complementarity 1 392.342  -438.909  4 549.295  
  (0.86)   [-0.26]   [1.38]   
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the 
community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household 
demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks and district 
fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the community level. 
 
Table 6 Impact on production 
 % HH engaged in: Quantity produced 
  All  
Labour- 
unconstrained 
Labour- 
constrained All  
Labour-
unconstrained 
Labour- 
constrained 
Maize production       
SCTP*d2014 -0.001 -0.004 -0.008 18.767 19.641 12.244 
 [-0.03] [-0.19] [-0.15] [1.22] [1.29] [0.52] 
FISP*d2014 0.067** 0.014 0.112** 65.581*** 61.179*** 61.037*** 
 [2.48] [0.72] [2.52] [6.42] [5.97] [4.49] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 0.033 0.003 0.081* 81.418*** 76.181*** 82.667*** 
 [0.98] [0.10] [1.64] [4.32] [3.70] [4.28] 
Incremental impact of FISP on 
SCTP 0.034 0.007 0.089** 62.651*** 56.540*** 70.423*** 
 [1.52] [0.28] [2.99] [5.40] [3.29] [4.08] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on 
FISP -0.034 -0.011 -0.031 15.837 15.002 21.629 
 [-0.94] [-0.39] [-0.56] [0.78] [0.70]  [0.97] 
Complementarity -0.033 -0.007 -0.023 -2.930 -4.639 9.386 
  [-0.94] [-0.22] [-0.4] [-0.19] [-0.25] [0.43] 
Grandnut production       
SCTP*d2014 0.090* 0.089 0.088 7.954** 8.654 7.076* 
 [1.86] [1.44] [1.54] [2.23] [1.68] [2.01] 
FISP*d2014 0.082*** 0.096** 0.082** 7.861** 6.145 9.508** 
 [4.04] [2.42] [2.37] [2.33] [1.25] [2.16] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 0.105** 0.105* 0.100* 9.038** 9.372** 8.112** 
 [2.14] [1.74] [1.99] [2.38] [2.19] [2.21] 
Incremental impact of FISP on 
SCTP 0.015 0.017 0.012 1.084  0.718 1.035 
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 [0.34] [0.31] [0.19] [0.47] [0.27] [0.24] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on 
FISP 0.022 0.009 0.018 1.177 3.227  -1.397 
 [0.45] [0.14] [0.3] [0.25] [0.60] [-0.25] 
Complementarity -0.067 -0.079 -0.069 -6.777 -5.428 -8.472 
  [-1.43] [-1.2] [-0.95] [-1.63] [-0.98] [-1.39] 
Pigeon pea production       
SCTP*d2014 0.016 0.102** -0.109 1.506 2.648 -0.09 
 [0.30] [2.05] [-1.57] [0.85] [1.25] [-0.06] 
FISP*d2014 0.094** 0.095** 0.071 3.706*** 3.916** 3.039** 
 [2.23] [2.33] [1.18] [2.85] [2.43] [2.31] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP 0.001 0.027 -0.035 1.929 1.405 2.28 
 [0.01] [0.49] [-0.64] [1.30] [0.82] [1.13] 
Incremental impact of FISP on 
SCTP -0.015 -0.074** 0.074 0.424 -1.243 2.370 
 [-0.86] [-2.49] [2.16] [0.41] [-0.76] [1.40] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on 
FISP -0.094 -0.067 -0.105 -1.776 -2.511 -0.759 
 [-1.56] [-1.04] [-1.58]  [-0.97] [-1.15] [-0.34] 
Complementarity -0.110** -0.169*** 0.004 -3.282** -5.159** -0.669 
  [-2.48] [-3.18] [0.05] [-2.14] [-2.40] [-0.32] 
Nkhwani production       
SCTP*d2014 -0.086* -0.122* -0.069 -0.954 -2.396 0.366 
 [-1.89] [-1.95] [-1.52] [-0.66] [-1.28] [0.25] 
FISP*d2014 0.001 -0.043 0.06 1.849 0.339 3.651*** 
 [0.03] [-0.86] [1.06] [1.45] [0.19] [2.81] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP -0.07 -0.104 -0.057 -0.3 -2.457 1.856 
 [-1.28] [-1.39] [-1.36] [-0.19] [-1.26] [1.19] 
Incremental impact of FISP on 
SCTP 0.015 0.018 0.012 0.653 -0.061 1.489 
 [0.57] [0.42] [0.38] [0.90]  [-0.09] [1.14] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on 
FISP -0.072 -0.061 -0.117* -2.149 -2.796 -1.795 
 [-1.28] [-0.86] [-1.77] [-1.44] [-1.53] [-0.96] 
Complementarity 0.014 0.061 -0.048 -1.195 -0.399 -2.162 
  [0.26] [0.95] [0.69] [-0.79] [-0.22] [-1.16] 
Rice production       
SCTP*d2014 -0.034 -0.025 -0.045 -2.551 -1.567 -2.568 
 [-0.80] [-0.45] [-1.07] [-0.86] [-0.45] [-0.80] 
FISP*d2014 0.01 0.011 0.003 -0.451 -1.754 0.294 
 [0.33] [0.34] [0.08] [-0.20] [-0.89] [0.13] 
Joint impact of SCTP and FISP -0.038 -0.061 0.004 -4.577 -5.850* -1.894 
 [-0.94] [-1.22] [0.10] [-1.54] [-1.91] [-0.67] 
Incremental impact of FISP on 
SCTP -0.004 -0.035 0.049 -2.026 -4.283 0.674 
 [-0.11] [-0.65] [1.32] [-0.87] [-1.39] [0.34] 
Incremental impact of SCTP on 
FISP -0.049 -0.072 0.001 -4.126 -4.096 -2.188 
 [-1.18] [-1.27] [0.02] [-1.03] [-1.04] [-0.61] 
Complementarity -0.015 -0.047 0.045 -1.575 -2.529 0.380 
  [-0.3] [-0.75] [0.77] [-0.53] [-0.77] [0.14] 
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the 
community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household 
demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks and district 
fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the community level. 
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Table 7  Impact on agricultural inputs 
 
% HH that use: 
  
  
Quantity 
  
  
  All  
Labour- 
unconstrained 
Labour- 
constrained All  
Labour-
unconstrained 
Labour- 
constrained 
Chemical fertilizers       
SCTP*d2014 0.058 -0.004 0.096 2.378 1.171 2.305 
 [0.85] [-0.04] [1.01] [0.99] [0.34] [0.65] 
FISP*d2014 0.472*** 0.354*** 0.562*** 21.638*** 15.819*** 26.205*** 
 [7.95] [3.55] [13.88] [7.80] [3.57] [7.93] 
Joint impact of SCTP and 
FISP 0.338*** 0.284*** 0.435*** 21.952*** 21.792*** 22.380*** 
 [5.03] [3.78] [4.17] [7.46] [6.20] [4.96] 
Incremental impact of FISP 
on SCTP 0.279*** 0.288** 0.339** 19.574*** 20.621*** 20.075*** 
 [4.04] [2.97] [2.82] [5.49] [4.08] [3.8] 
Incremental impact of SCTP 
on FISP -0.134** -0.070 -0.127 0.314 5.972 -3.825 
 [-2.12] [-0.89] [-1.26] [0.10] [1.51] [-0.9] 
Complementarity -0.192** -0.066 -0.223* -2.063 4.802 -6.130 
  [-2.09] [-0.49] [-1.75] [ -0.47] [0.77] [-1] 
Organic fertilizers    Value   
SCTP*d2014 0.046 -0.009 0.122 213.131* 207.302 208.637* 
 [0.64] [-0.09] [1.50] [1.92] [1.38] [1.79] 
FISP*d2014 -0.082 -0.072 -0.083 -201.953** -178.551* -221.040*** 
 [-1.35] [-0.85] [-1.46] [-2.65] [-1.81] [-2.81] 
Joint impact of SCTP and 
FISP -0.069 -0.158 0.077 114.853 91.057 162.463 
 [-0.75] [-1.32] [0.94] [0.93] [0.56] [1.39] 
Incremental impact of FISP 
on SCTP -0.115 -0.149 -0.045 -98.278 -116.246 -46.175 
 [-1.81] [-1.36] [-0.70] [-1.04] [0.65] [-0.63] 
Incremental impact of SCTP 
on FISP 0.013 -0.086 0.160* 316.806*** 269.607** 383.503*** 
 [0.16] [-0.81] [1.86] [2.94] [1.96] [3.38] 
Complementarity -0.033 -0.077 0.038 103.675 62.305 174.866* 
  [-0.36] [-0.53] [0.46] [0.86] [0.31] [1.77] 
Pesticides       
SCTP*d2014 -0.004 -0.02 0.012    
 [-0.25] [-0.74] [0.95]    
FISP*d2014 -0.01 -0.023 0.001    
 [-0.74] [-1.16] [0.06]    
Joint impact of SCTP and 
FISP 0.031 -0.004 0.062**    
 [1.60] [-0.15] [2.68]    
Incremental impact of FISP 
on SCTP 0.035** 0.015 0.051*    
 [2.39] [0.54] [1.94]    
Incremental impact of SCTP 
on FISP 0.041** 0.019 0.062**    
 [2.46] [0.77] [2.33]    
Complementarity 0.045** 0.039 0.050    
  [2.36] [1.21] [1.61]    
Improved or hybrid seeds       
SCTP*d2014 0.05 -0.021 0.118*    
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 [1.04] [-0.36] [1.67]    
FISP*d2014 0.125*** 0.121* 0.136*    
 [3.32] [1.96] [1.98]    
Joint impact of SCTP and 
FISP 0.115 0.087 0.171*    
 [1.49] [1.01] [1.93]    
Incremental impact of FISP 
on SCTP  0.065 0.108 0.053    
 [0.83] [1.13] [ 0.76]     
Incremental impact of SCTP 
on FISP -0.010 -0.034 0.035    
 [-0.11] [-0.31] [0.37]    
Complementarity -0.060 -0.013 -0.083    
  [-0.67] [-0.11] [-0.82]    
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the 
community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household 
demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks and district 
fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the community level. 
Table 8 Impact on livestock expenses and sales 
  Expenses Sales 
  All  
Labour- 
unconstrained 
Labour -
constrained All  
Labour- 
unconstrained 
Labour- 
constrained 
SCTP*d2014 1 172.647*** 1 395.706*** 761.950*** -78.668 -44.992 -247.801 
 [5.95] [6.07] [2.83] [-0.54] [-0.18] [-1.23] 
FISP*d2014 232.985*** 493.282*** 32.287 57.964 231.508 62.384 
 [2.96] [3.66] [0.28] [0.37] [0.76] [0.27] 
Joint impact of 
SCTP and FISP 1 688.574*** 1 478.082*** 1 997.143*** 395.800* 383.684 335.607 
 [5.89] [3.92] [6.19] [1.98] [1.05] [1.06] 
Incremental 
impact of FISP on 
SCTP 515.926* 82.3756 1 235.193*** 474.468** 428.676 583.408 
 [1.82] [0.2] [4.68] [2.03] [1.08] [1.57] 
Incremental 
impact of SCTP on 
FISP 1 455.59*** 984.800** 1 964.855*** 337.836* 152.176 273.224 
 [5.04] [2.52] [5.33] [1.7] [0.5] [0.8] 
Complementarity 282.941 -410.906 1 202.906*** 416.505 197.167 521.024 
  [0.99] [-0.94] [3.83] [1.50] [0.43] [1.17] 
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the 
community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household 
demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks and district 
fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the community level. 
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Table 9  Impact on livestock 
  % HH that own: Quantity 
  All  
Labour- 
unconstrained 
Labour- 
constrained All  
Labour- 
unconstrained 
Labour- 
constrained 
Chicken       
SCTP*d2014 0.196*** 0.150*** 0.236*** 0.931*** 0.698** 1.365*** 
 [3.81] [2.77] [3.20] [3.03] [2.62] [3.04] 
FISP*d2014 0.103*** 0.134** 0.029 0.276* 0.408 -0.067 
 [2.80] [2.29] [0.77] [1.96] [1.34] [-0.31] 
Joint impact of SCTP and 
FISP 0.244*** 0.230*** 0.263** 1.677*** 1.511*** 1.828*** 
 [4.31] [4.54] [2.72] [3.90] [4.19] [3.03] 
Incremental impact of 
FISP on SCTP 0.047** 0.080* 0.027 0.746* 0.814**  0.463 
 [2.32] [1.81] [0.46] [1.90] [2.68] [0.98] 
Incremental impact of 
SCTP on FISP 0.141** 0.095 0.234**  1.400*** 1.104** 1.894** 
 [2.56] [1.43] [2.13] [3.29] [2.39] [2.85] 
Complementarity -0.055 -0.054 -0.002 0.469 0.406 0.529 
  [-1.35] [-0.71] [-0.03] [1.20] [1.06] [1.08] 
Goats and sheep       
SCTP*d2014 0.108*** 0.114*** 0.075* 0.145 0.263* 0.03 
 [3.99] [2.99] [1.91] [1.36] [1.84] [0.35] 
FISP*d2014 0.062* 0.099 0.025 0.145 0.294 0.021 
 [2.01] [1.53] [0.59] [1.30] [1.46] [0.19] 
Joint impact of SCTP and 
FISP 0.238*** 0.185*** 0.300*** 0.694*** 0.758*** 0.452*** 
 [5.79] [3.75] [5.93] [3.93] [2.99] [4.18] 
Incremental impact of 
FISP on SCTP 0.131*** 0.071 0.226*** 0.549** 0.495** 0.422*** 
 [4.31] [1.44] [6.35] [2.96]  [2.15] [4.87] 
Incremental impact of 
SCTP on FISP 0.176*** 0.086 0.276*** 0.549** 0.464* 0.431*** 
 [3.70] [1.24] [4.48] [2.89] [1.73] [3.60] 
Complementarity 0.069* -0.028 0.201*** 0.404* 0.201 0 .401** 
  [1.71] [-0.34] [3.44] [1.86] [0.68] [2.91] 
Pigeons, doves, or ducks     
SCTP*d2014 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.136* 0.263** -0.083 
 [0.48] [0.37] [0.06] [1.71] [2.33] [-0.83] 
FISP*d2014 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 0.065 0.143 -0.045 
 [-0.38] [-0.27] [-0.34] [1.21] [1.20] [-0.63] 
Joint impact of SCTP and 
FISP 0.060** 0.064* 0.052* 0.280** 0.336** 0.238* 
 [2.55] [1.84] [1.71] [2.74] [2.09] [1.80] 
Incremental impact of 
FISP on SCTP 0.053* 0.058* 0.051 0.144 0.072 0.320* 
 [1.91] [1.7] [1.28] [1.15] [0.45]  [1.67] 
Incremental impact of 
SCTP on FISP 0.064** 0.070* 0.057* 0.215** 0.192 0.283* 
 [2.65] [1.9] [1.7] [2.12] [1.32] [1.81] 
Complementarity 0.057* 0.064 0.056 0.079 -0.071 0.365* 
  [1.89] [1.5] [1.31] [0.58] [-0.38] [1.73] 
Note: Statistical significance at the 99% (***), 95 (**) and 90% (**) confidence levels. Robust t-statistics clustered at the 
community level are in brackets. All estimations control for baseline head of household’s characteristics, household 
demographic composition and size, a vector of contemporaneous cluster level prices, a set of exogenous shocks and district 
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fixed effect, and are adjusted with the GPS weighting. Confidence intervals consider heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the community level. 
Appendix C 
Table A1  Anova test for difference between groups included in the analysis 
and groups excluded 
  Excluded Included F-test P-value>F 
Single head of hh 0.665 0.750 28.78 0.0000 
Female head of hh 0.827 0.854 4.51 0.034 
Age of head of hh 60.021 55.583 43.230 0.000 
# Members in the hh 4.543 4.528 0.03 0.857 
# Members in the hh: 0-5 years old 0.600 0.747 22.23 0.000 
# Members in the hh: 6-12 years old 1.153 1.218 3.06 0.080 
# Members in the hh: 13-17 years old 0.948 0.898 2.28 0.131 
# Members in the hh: 18-64 years old 1.193 1.126 3.56 0.059 
# Members in the hh: >=65 years old 0.649 0.538 24.72 0.000 
# Orphans in the hh 0.864 1.014 8.37 0.004 
Yrs of education head of hh  0.994 1.157 4.89 0.027 
HH severely labour-constrained 0.472 0.471 0.01 0.926 
HH consumption - total 18 9278.4 15 8798.5 55.62 0.000 
HH consumption - food and beverages 14 7563.4 12 3544.5 55.21 0.000 
HH owns or cultivates land 0.991 0.919 112.79 0.000 
Total plot area operated within hh 1.454 1.177 65.41 0.000 
HH has plot that is irrigated 0.046 0.051 0.37 0.543 
HH applies chemical fertilizer 0.947 0.323 2546.7 0.000 
HH applies organic fertilizer 0.226 0.267 7.37 0.007 
HH uses pesticides 0.026 0.019 1.65 0.199 
HH uses improved or hybrid seed 0.511 0.269 217.16 0.000 
HH planted maize 0.979 0.869 158.97 0.000 
HH planted groundnut 0.236 0.122 74.26 0.000 
HH planted pigeon pea 0.264 0.136 85.55 0.000 
Value of production 16 412.3 10 009.8 371.21 0.000 
HH owns hand hoe 0.922 0.814 89.57 0.000 
HH owns axe 0.166 0.103 28.98 0.000 
HH owns panga knife 0.258 0.203 14.14 0.000 
HH owns sickle 0.218 0.145 29.39 0.000 
HH owns chickens  0.189 0.120 30.74 0.000 
HH owns goat or a sheep  0.131 0.067 37.93 0.000 
Total hh expenditure for livestock 82.11 65.63 1.23 0.268 
Total hh livestock sales 494.32 246.00 16.48 0.000 
Observations         1 756 1 607     
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Table A2  Anova test for difference between groups of intervention: control 
(C), SCTP, FISP, SCTP and FISP (unadjusted) 
  C SCTP FISP 
SCTP and 
FISP F-test 
P-
value>F 
Single head of hh 0.760 0.749 0.748 0.730 0.32 0.8097 
Female head of hh 0.870 0.839 0.857 0.846 0.76 0.514 
Age of head of hh 53.160 54.294 58.477 60.199 9.93 0.000 
# Members in the hh 4.620 4.487 4.565 4.391 0.74 0.525 
# Members in the hh: 0-5 years old 0.822 0.798 0.596 0.636 5.13 0.002 
# Members in the hh: 6-12 years old 1.568 1.418 1.619 1.439 2.27 0.079 
# Members in the hh: 13-17 years old 0.581 0.624 0.658 0.612 0.61 0.608 
# Members in the hh: 18-64 years old 1.164 1.115 1.049 0.971 2.83 0.057 
# Members in the hh: >=65 years old 0.485 0.533 0.643 0.733 12.22 0.000 
# Orphans in the hh 1.030 1.026 0.955 1.009 0.14 0.937 
Yrs of education head of hh  1.149 1.246 1.273 0.925 1.57 0.195 
HH severely labour-constrained 0.438 0.461 0.534 0.500 2.51 0.057 
HH consumption - total 15 7874.4 15 0568.1 17 1136.3 16 4813.3 1.41 0.238 
HH consumption - food and 
beverages 12 2879.6 11 7390.8 13 0279.3 13 0018.5 1.89 0.129 
HH owns or cultivates land 0.916 0.910 0.933 0.927 0.47 0.702 
Total plot area operated within hh 1.199 1.080 1.276 1.220 2.89 0.034 
HH has plot that is irrigated 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.063 0.41 0.747 
HH applies chemical fertilizer 0.279 0.278 0.370 0.448 11.2 0.000 
HH applies organic fertilizer 0.274 0.222 0.279 0.319 3.22 0.022 
HH uses pesticides 0.013 0.021 0.020 0.027 0.8 0.494 
HH uses improved or hybrid seed 0.279 0.232 0.271 0.311 2.15 0.092 
HH planted maize 0.873 0.863 0.850 0.890 0.69 0.559 
HH planted groundnut 0.100 0.111 0.118 0.187 4.92 0.002 
HH planted pigeon pea 0.131 0.139 0.115 0.157 0.72 0.541 
Value of production 9 906.1 9 154.9 10 737.9 11 100.2 2.98 0.030 
HH owns hand hoe 0.818 0.778 0.814 0.870 7.97 0.000 
HH owns axe 0.096 0.079 0.106 0.152 13.01 0.000 
HH owns panga knife 0.192 0.201 0.195 0.235 4.28 0.005 
HH owns sickle 0.156 0.125 0.110 0.189 10.7 0.000 
HH owns chickens  0.133 0.117 0.115 0.102 7.85 0.000 
HH owns goat or a sheep  0.074 0.046 0.069 0.090 22.19 0.000 
Total hh expenditure for livestock 90.12 49.37 43.69 63.720 47.69 0.000 
Total hh livestock sales 266.64 238.49 170.20 280.338 1.43 0.231 
Observations         616 485 239 267     
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